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Abstract
In this paper, a solution to the problem of theoretical terms is de-
veloped that is based on Carnap’s doctrine of indirect interpretation of
theoretical terms. This doctrine will be given a semantic, model-theoretic
explanation that is not given by Carnap himself as he remains content
with a syntactic explanation. From that semantic explanation, rules for
the truth-value assignment to postulates, i. e. sentences that determine
the meaning of theoretical terms, are derived. The logical status of postu-
lates will be clarified thereby in such a way that the problem of theoretical
terms disappears.
Keywords: Model-theory, statement view, structuralist theory of science, theo-
retical terms.
1 Introduction
In structuralism, the problem of theoretical terms serves as a major objection to
the statement-view in philosophy of science, i. e. the view that scientific theories
may well be reconstructed as sets of statements. In essence, the problem is a
semantical circle that concerns the relation between the meaning of theoreti-
cal terms and the meaning of axioms in which these terms occur. This circle
appears to have no solution if the axioms of a scientific theory are seen as sen-
tences or statements in the sense of predicate logic. By contrast, the problem
of theoretical can be circumvented if the Ramsey sentence of a theory is chosen
to represent that theory. This strategy has been pursued and further developed
by Sneed in his The Logical Structure of Mathematical Physics (1979).
It is, I think, beyond doubt that with the structuralist framework a great ad-
vancement has been achieved in comparison to earlier attempts at logical re-
construction of scientific theories, as given by Carnap, Nagel, Braithwaite and
others. In the present paper, I will nevertheless show that the structuralist cri-
tique of the statement view is based on assumptions which are not in accordance
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with Carnap’s doctrines concerning the semantics of theoretical terms. His doc-
trine of indirect interpretation of theoretical terms requires rather a modification
of the truth-conditional semantics to which Carnap himself, incoherently, ad-
heres in his work on predicate logic since the Introduction to Semantics (1942).
Such a modification will be developed in the present paper. The problem of
theoretical terms will thereby be given another solution, in addition to what is
called the Ramsey solution. Finally, the equivalence of the two solutions will
be shown. At another place I hope to show that the solution developed here is
also of interest from the perspective of structuralism.
2 Exposition of the Problem
Considered are scientific theories which are given in a more or less explicit
axiomatic formulation. Sneed observes that there is a plethora of theories for
which the following is true:
i) There is at least one term t such that the values of t can be determined
iff the truth of sentences which are axioms of a theory T is assumed. Let
Φ be designating the set of these sentences; t is either a predicate or a
function symbol but not a constant.
ii) The truth-values of the sentences of Φ are determinable iff the values of
the term t are already given.
In light of this observation the following criterion is set up:
D 1. A Term t is theoretical with respect to a theory T , or T-theoretical, iff there
is no application of T in which the value of t can be determined independently
from the axioms of T . An application of T is an application of certain axioms
of T to a system of empirical entities.
In short, the problem of theoretical terms consists in a mutual dependency
between the extension of a term and the truth-values of several axioms of a
theory. Why is this threatening the cogency of a scientific theory? Now, the
application of the axiomatic apparatus of a theory T to a system of empirical
objects is to be understood as implying the claim that certain axioms of T are
true of a non-empty set of empirical objects. Suppose that the axioms of a theory
T contain one or several terms which are T-theoretical. It follows then that there
is a term t whose values can only be determined with the help of sentences of
Φ. Assume furthermore that t is specific to T in such a manner that every
application of T implies an assertion regarding the values of t. (This assumption
has been shown to apply to several theories.) The problem of theoretical terms
then arises from the question of how an application of T can ever be justified.
This is because justifying the application of a theory requires one to know
whether the axioms of T are true in the respective application. But the truth-
values of these axioms are dependent on the values of t. And these values can,
due to the theoretical character of t, only be determined if the axioms of T are
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assumed to be true. We are thus captured in an epistemological circle when we
attempt to justify the application of certain axioms of T to a system of empirical
entities.
The circle described is not only an epistemological one but also a semantic
one, provided we view our methods of determining the extension of a linguistic
expression as constituting its meaning. Then, the mutual dependency between
the extension of t and the extension of the sentences of Φ makes it difficult, if
not impossible, to give a clear account of the meaning of t and of the meaning
of the sentences of Φ.
The problem of theoretical terms may be exemplified at the measurement of the
force function with the help of Hooke’s law. This law goes as follows:
(2) F = −k(x1 − x0),
where F stands for the force vector acting upon a coil spring, x1 and x0 are
spatial vectors of the movable side of the coil spring where a force may impact,
causing an elongation. x0 is the vector when there is no force acting, and
x1 the vector when the force F is acting. The constant k is dependent on
particular properties of the coil spring. Assume that the value of a certain
force is measured by a spring balance. Then, since such a measurement rests
on the validity of Hooke’s law, we have to assume that this law is valid in the
measurement procedure. However, if we attempt to justify this application of
Hooke’s law, the value of the force function which ought to be measured would
have to be known to us in advance. This situation appears to be inadmissible.
It would be no solution to the problem under consideration if the value of the
force function is determined by another law of classical mechanics, say by the
law of gravitation or Newton’s second law. Such a strategy would only postpone
the problem, but would not solve it. Nor would it be appropriate to interpret
Hooke’s law as a definition of the force function. Such a presumed definition
would cover only a limited range of applications of classical mechanics, and
could therefore not serve as a general definition of force. Finally, it is important
to note that, in the existing expositions of classical mechanics, no technique
of measurement for the force function can be found which does not depend on
some law of this theory.1
One may object to the present exposition of the problem of theoretical terms
that it is given in an empiricist and antirealist framework, thereby suggesting
to dissolve that problem by simply abandoning the framework in which it is
formulated. To this I reply that although the Ramsey solution qualifies as an
empiricist position, it is far from clear whether Sneed’s exposition of the problem
rests on empiricist assumptions already. As shown here, this exposition is mainly
based on the observation that there are linguistic expressions in the axioms of
scientific theories whose extension can only be determined with the help of
such axioms. This observation does not imply a commitment to empiricism or
1For the original exposition of the problem see Sneed (1979), pp. 31–40.
3
antirealism in an obvious way.2
3 The Ramsey Solution
The strategy Sneed pursued to solve the problem of theoretical terms is based on
the Ramsey sentence of a theory. The explanation of the meaning and structure
of the Ramsey sentence requires some preliminaries concerning the dual-level
conception of scientific language. Essential to this conception is the subdivision
of the language into an observational and a theoretical level. For this subdivision
I will assume the following explanations:
E 1. An expression belongs to the observational level if the determination of its
extension, or at least a part of its extension, can proceed in a direct manner. In
this case there is a method of determination which does not depend on general
axioms or rules of inference which are assumed to be valid.
E 2. An expression belongs to the theoretical level if every method of deter-
mining its extension, or at least a part of its extension, rests on inferences. The
validity of these inferences is dependent on general axioms or rules of inference
which are neither true for logical reasons nor true in virtue of being a definition.
Although these explanations are not explicitly stated by Carnap, they appear
to elucidate the semantic distinction between the two levels of the language in
2The problem of theoretical terms has received surprisingly little attention in the context
of the debate on realism and antirealism. I may contemplate shortly on the question of
whether it has some bearing on this debate. Antirealism may be defined as the view that the
meaning of a linguistic expression is identified with our means of determining the extension
of that expression. (This definition goes back to Dummett (1978), p. 146. That the focus of
Dummett’s explanation is on sentence meaning but not on the meaning of linguistic expressions
in general seems inessential to our discussion.) Let us assume that scientific terms such as
“force” in classical mechanics do have sense, where the sense, or intensional meaning, of a
linguistic expression is what determines its extension. In the context of the present discussion
the question arises of whether we shall account for the sense of a theoretical term in an
antirealist or realist fashion. The antirealist will clearly refer to the axioms of T as these are
essential to our means of determining the extension of theoretical terms. By contrast, it is far
from clear how a realist account of the sense of theoretical terms may look like. I am not aware
of a satisfying answer to this question to be found in the literature. In particular, possible
worlds semantics seem of limited help as these semantics take the extension of scientific terms
as something that is already given. Rejecting the assumption that scientific terms do have
sense seems not promising either because a purely extensional account of the meaning of
scientific terms has its own shortcomings. For example, such an account would require a
student of physics first to know the extension of the expression “force” in order to understand
the meaning of that expression. By contrast, the teaching of physics and other natural sciences
focuses rather on axioms and general explanations of how the extension of scientific terms can
be determined when such terms are introduced.
Of course, these remarks are insufficient by far to rule out a realist approach to the meaning
of theoretical terms. But they seem to indicate that the problem of theoretical terms is
potentially apt to be used in a strong case for antirealism. For this reason we should not
be surprised if the solutions proposed to this problem remain in an antirealist framework.
Needless to say, there is a large number of philosophers of science who disagree totally with
an antirealist approach to scientific theories. I am, however, not going to discuss metaphysical
issues in the remainder of the paper.
4
an appropriate manner. Note that the criterion following from the explana-
tions is applicable not only to formal systems but also to the non-formalized
usage of language. In a more extended discussion it could be shown that sev-
eral arguments against the cogency of the distinction between observational and
theoretical language, prominently raised by Kuhn and Feyerabend, are not suf-
ficient to refute the assumption of a semantically stable observational language
having an interpretation which does not depend on any axiomatic theory of the
natural sciences. (See Andreas (2007).)
The distinction between two levels of the language gives rise to the following,
well known distinction among the axioms of a theory:
i) C-postulates containing observational as well as theoretical terms.
ii) T-postulates containing only theoretical terms as non-logical symbols.
The set of T-postulates is also called the pure theory, whereas the set-theoretic
sum of C- and T-postulates is called the interpreted theory. Among the T-
postulates there are general sentences which are considered to be laws of nature
in a non-technical sense.
Some notational conventions need to be introduced at this point. Vo is the set
of non-logical symbols of the observational language, whereas Vt is the set of
non-logical symbols of the theoretical language. Sent(L(Vo)) designates the set
of well formed sentences of the observational language, Sent(L(Vo, Vt)) those of
the entire language containing Vo and Vt symbols. Let this system contain a
sign for the identity between individual terms, i. e. terms designating individu-
als. Sent(L(Vo, Vt)) \ Sent(L(Vo)) stands for the set of sentences containing at
least one theoretical term. TC(t1, . . . , tn, n1, . . . , nk) stands for the conjunction
of T- and C- postulates, where t1, . . . , tn are theoretical predicates or theoretical
function symbols, and n1, . . . , nk predicates or function symbols of the observa-
tional language. It is important to note that, at least in Carnap’s and Ramsey’s
version of the dual-level conception, there are no non-logical terms at the theo-
retical level designating individuals. Carnap assumes that there are individual
constants at the theoretical level which are designating the natural numbers,
yet he considers these symbols as logical ones. (See Carnap (1934), p. 255 or
Carnap (1937), p. 327.)
The Ramsey sentence of a theory TC results from the following transformations.
In the first step, the predicates and function symbols t1, . . . , tn are replaced in
TC, the conjunction of postulates, by appropriate second order variables. In
the second step, these variables are bound by existential quantifiers. As result
we receive TCR, the Ramsey sentence of a theory TC:
(2) ∃X1 . . . ∃Xn TC(X1, . . . , Xn, n1, . . . , nk).
In Words: There are extensions of the theoretical terms for which the postulates
TC are true sentences.
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To what extent is it justified to view the Ramsey sentence as a solution to the
problem of theoretical terms? There are two reasons for claiming this. The
first reason is that the Ramsey sentence TCR and the original theory TC are
deductively equivalent with respect to their observational consequences, i. e.
every sentence which can be derived from TC is also derivable from TCR. The
following proposition is therefore valid:3
(3) For every L(Vo) sentence φ: TC ` φ iff TCR ` φ.
With respect to the predictions and retrodictions at the observational level there
is thus no difference between the original theory and its Ramsey-sentence. From
an empiricist point of view the Ramsey sentence appears therefore to be a fully
satisfying surrogate for the original theory.
The second, even more important reason in favour of the Ramsey solution is
that, in the Ramsey sentence, the axioms of the theory do not have the status
of true propositions in the sense of predicate logic any more. By the Ramsey-
sentence it is rather claimed that there are extensions of the theoretical terms
satisfying the axioms of TC. Such a claim implies no assertion regarding the
truth of these axioms. It is thus not required to justify the truth of any single
axiom in order to justify the truth of the Ramsey sentence, which implies that
the problem of theoretical terms does not occur.
Expounding the problem of theoretical terms and showing how it can be solved
by the Ramsey account is not the sole objective of Sneed’s (1971). Rather, he
points out what he regards as several defects of the Ramsey view and hence-
forward develops the emended Ramsey view, which is the starting point of the
structuralist account. The solution to the problem of theoretical terms to be
developed here will be shown to be equivalent to the Ramsey view but not to
the emended Ramsey view. For an attempt to develop an account based on
the dual-level conception which is equivalent to the emended Ramsey view see
Andreas (2007).
4 Indirect Interpretation of Theoretical Terms
In preparation of a second solution to the problem of theoretical terms I may
argue for the following proposition:
P 1. The problem of theoretical terms arises iff a direct interpretation of these
terms is assumed. By contrast, in Carnap’s version of the dual-level conception,
the theoretical terms are provided with an indirect interpretation.
The distinction between direct and indirect interpretation stems from Carnap’s
logic of science and stands in the need of further explanation:
E 3. The interpretation of a symbol is direct iff it is given by expressions of the
meta-language and consists in an assignment of an intension or extension.
3For proof see Tuomela (1973), pp. 57–58.
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E 4. The interpretation of a symbol is indirect iff it is given by sentences of
the object language which have the status of valid non-logical axioms in the
calculus.
The distinction may be exemplified at a simple example. The predicates “R”
and “A” are interpreted in a direct manner by so-called rules of designation:
(4) The predicate “R” designates the property of being rational.
(5) The predicate “A” designates the property of being an animal.
By contrast, the predicate “H” is interpreted indirectly by the following defini-
tion:
(6) ∀x(H(x)↔ R(x) ∧A(x)).
Sentences of the object language which interpret symbols of this language have
a particular status. Their truth-value is - in contrast to every other logical
complex sentence - neither dependent on the extension of the non-logical sym-
bols nor dependent on the valuations of the variables of the language. Rather
their function consists in determining the extension of those non-logical symbols
which are introduced into the language in an indirect manner. In Carnap’s logic
of science there are two kinds of indirect interpretation, one by definition and
another by postulates. This distinguishes his account from most other predicate
logic-based-accounts of scientific language.4
How can we understand the indirect interpretation of a symbol by postulates?
Carnap confines himself to giving an explanation of the syntactic function of
postulates: Postulates are, according to Carnap, non-logical axioms which are
taken to be valid in the calculus and which therefore can be used in every
derivation. An intuitive understanding of postulates is not required in order to
justify their use in the calculus. The theoretical part of the calculus is rather
‘free floating’ and connected with the empirical world only by the interpretation
of the observational terms. (See again Carnap (1939), pp. 67–69.)
I will now, in addition to Carnap’s syntactic explanation, move the focus onto
the semantic function of postulates. Some insight regarding this may be de-
rived from an explanation of the semantic function of a definition. Based on
the exposition of Beth’s definability theorem, as given in standard accounts of
mathematical logic, we can explain the interpretation of a term by a definition
as follows:
E 5. Semantically seen, a set Φd of sentences that defines a non-logical symbol P
in a language L(V ) does impose a constraint on the admissible interpretations of
L(V ∪{P}). This means, in terms of model-theoretic semantics, every admissible
structure of the language L(V ∪ {P}) must satisfy Φd. With respect to a given
4For an explicit statement concerning the doctrine of indirect interpretation of theoretical
terms see Carnap (1939), pp. 65–69 and Carnap (1956), p. 46n.
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L(V ) structure A there is only one L(V ∪ {P}) structure that expands A such
that Φd is satisfied. Thus, there is a unique interpretation of P due to the
conjoined constraint by Φd and A.
In what respects needs this explanation to be modified to account for the se-
mantic function of postulates? From the expositions given in Carnap (1939),
(1956), and (1958) it is apparent that the interpretation of theoretical terms
by postulates is a rather holistic affair in the sense that a set of postulates
interprets a set of theoretical terms. As a consequence of this, there is no one-
to-one correspondence between a symbol and a set of sentences that interprets
that symbol. It should furthermore not be assumed that the interpretation of
theoretical terms results in a unique determination of the extension of these
terms.5
Yet another difference between definitions and postulates is that the introduc-
tion of theoretical terms by postulates may be accompanied by the introduction
of another, theoretical domain of interpretation, in addition to the domain of
interpretation for the observational language L(Vo). In the case of Carnap’s
dual-level conception a domain of (mathematical) theoretical entities is assumed
for the interpretation of the Vt symbols, while in the case of Ramsey’s concep-
tion Vo and Vt symbols have the same domain of interpretation. Taking these
differences into account when observing the semantic similarities between defi-
nitions and postulates may result in the following explanation of the semantic
function of postulates:
E 6. Semantically seen, a set ΦTC of postulates that interprets a set of theo-
retical terms Vt on the basis of a language L(Vo) does impose a constraint on
the admissible interpretations of the language L(Vo, Vt). This means, in terms
of model-theoretic semantics, every admissible L(Vo, Vt) structure must satisfy
ΦTC . The admissible L(Vo, Vt) structures may have two domains of interpreta-
tion, one observational domain Do and a domain of theoretical entities Dt. With
respect to a given L(Vo) structure A there may be several L(Vo, Vt) structures
that extend A and satisfy ΦTC .
Since the interpretation of the symbols Vo is assumed to be fixed by a given direct
interpretation, there is a twofold imposition on the interpretation of theoretical
terms, one by the interpretation of L(Vo) and another by the postulates TC.
This twofold imposition on the values of theoretical terms may be visualized by
the following figure:
5Carnaps dictum that the interpretation of theoretical terms necessarily remains open to
further strengthening seems to imply that the interpretation of a theoretical term by postulates
does not amount to a unique determination of the extension of that term. For a closer
examination of this point see Andreas (2007), p. 157.
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Observational language
Theoretical language
Non-logical symbols of Vo
Non-logical symbols of Vt
-
-
Direct interpretation
Indirect interpretation by
postulates
Unique determination of the
Vo symbols and the L(Vo)
sentences
Constraint on the admissible
valuations of the Vt symbols
and the L(Vo, Vt) sentences
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(Figure 1)
If a sentence φ is a postulate of the theory, then the truth-value assignment to
φ belongs to the interpretation of the theoretical terms and is therefore not the
result of a preceding direct interpretation. Hence, the truth-value assignment
to postulates requires no information concerning the extensions of theoretical
terms. This is the decisive argument in favour of proposition P1, the central
claim of this section.6
5 The Truth-Value Assignment to Theoretical
Sentences
The above figure is apt to provide an intuitive understanding of the notion of an
indirect interpretation. However, precise rules for the truth-value assignment
to theoretical sentences are, of course, not yet derivable from it. Such rules are
being developed now. I will start from a general explanation of what it means
that a set of sentences which have determinate truth values imposes a constraint
on the admissible valuations of other sentences:
E 7. Φ1 and Φ2 are disjoint sets of sentences. ν1 : Φ1 → {T, F}, i. e. ν1 is
a function mapping sentences onto truth-values. Φ1,c = {φ | ν1(φ) = T} ∪
{¬φ | ν1(φ) = F}. Φ1,c is the conjunction of the set of sentences containing
every true sentence of Φ1 and the set containing the negation of every false
sentence of Φ1. A constraint on the admissible valuations of sentences of Φ2
is imposed on by the values of sentences belonging to Φ1. Then we say that
any valuation ν2(φ), ν2 : Φ2 → {T, F} satisfying the following rules is called an
admissible valuation:
6It has to be admitted that there are versions of the dual-level conception in which a direct
interpretation of theoretical terms is assumed; this is the case with the ones of Hempel (1958)
and Tuomela (1973). Carnap’s version is nevertheless, according to his own explanations,
bound to an indirect interpretation of theoretical terms. (See Carnap (1939) pp. 65–69 and
Carnap (1956), p. 46n.)
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i) ν2(φ)= T iff the affirmation of φ is compatible with Φ1,c in the sense that
Φ1,c ∪ {φ} is satisfiable.
ii) ν2(φ)= F iff the negation of φ is compatible with Φ1,c in the sense that Φ1,c
∪ {¬φ} is satisfiable.
These conventions give only a unique determination of the value of a sentence
φ if the affirmation of φ is admissible and the negation of φ is not or vice versa.
To put it formally:
E 8. Φ1, Φ1,c, Φ2, ν1 and ν2 are like in E7. Then the sentences of Φ2 are to be
valuated according to the following rules:
i) ν2(φ)= T due to the imposition by Φ1 iff Φ1,c ∪ {φ} is satisfiable and Φ1,c ∪
{¬φ} is not.
ii) ν2(φ)= F due to the imposition by Φ1 iff Φ1,c ∪ {¬φ} is satisfiable and Φ1,c
∪ {φ} is not.
These conventions may now be applied to the interpretation of theoretical sen-
tences. According to the above explanation, the admissible values of sentences
containing theoretical terms are limited firstly by the postulates TC and sec-
ondly by the values of the observational sentences. The values of the latter can
be represented by the set Φo containing every true sentence of L(Vo). ΦTC is
the set of postulates. Applying E8 to the valuation of theoretical sentences we
receive:
E 9. νt(φ) is a partial valuation for sentences of Sent(L(Vo, Vt))\ Sent(L(Vo))\
ΦTC .
i) νt(φ) = T iff ΦTC ∪ Φo |= φ and ΦTC ∪ Φo ∪ {φ} is satisfiable.
ii) νt(φ) = F iff ΦTC ∪ Φo |= ¬φ and ΦTC ∪ Φo ∪ {¬φ} is satisfiable.
These rules leave open what the value of a sentence φ is if one of the following
two cases occurs:
i) Both ΦTC ∪ Φo ∪ {φ} and ΦTC ∪ Φo ∪ {¬φ} are satisfiable.
ii) Neither ΦTC ∪ Φo ∪ {φ} nor ΦTC ∪ Φo ∪ {¬φ} is satisfiable.
Hence, we are to be prepared that there are truth-value gaps at the theoretical
level which require a certain deviation from classical logic. The most convenient
way to deal with such truth-value gaps appears to be the supervaluation logic
developed by Bas van Fraassen and Graham Priest. Priest (2001), pp. 131–134,
defines the set of supervaluations with respect to a partial classical valuation in
the following manner:
D 2. Sent(L1) stands for the set of sentences of a language L1. νp : Φp →
{T, F}, where Φp is a subset of Sent(L1). Every valuation νs satisfying the
following conditions is a supervaluation with respect to νp :
i) νs : Sent(L1)→ {T, F}.
ii) νs(φ) = νp(φ) for every φ ∈ Φp.
iii) {φ | νs(φ) = T} is satisfiable.
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According to the second condition, every supervaluation νs must agree with νp
in the domain of sentences where νp is defined. Those sentences whose values
are not determined by νp are assigned to arbitrary values. Condition iii) ensures
that the truth-rules for the sentential connectives and quantifiers are satisfied
within one and the same valuation νs.
In the domain of valuations which are supervaluations with respect to a certain
partial valuation the axioms of classical logic remain valid. In particular, a
revision of the tertium non datur is not required. Likewise, the usual definitions
of logical truth and logical consequence are retained. It is only the notion of
truth and falsehood which require a certain modification. In order to account
for the difference between “real” values and assignments of arbitrary values, just
filling the truth-value gaps, these notions are understood as follows:
E 10. Given is a partial valuation νp for the sentences of a language L1. Ss =
{νs(1), νs(2), . . . } is the set of corresponding supervaluations.
i) φ is true iff νs(i)(φ) = T for every νs(i) ∈ Ss.
ii) φ is false iff νs(i)(φ) = F for every νs(i) ∈ Ss.
iii) φ is indeterminate iff there are natural numbers k and j such that νs(k)(φ)
= T and νs(j)(φ) = F.
Note that there are not only sentences of Φp which have determinate values
but also ones of Sent(L1) \Φp. More precisely, every sentence of Sent(L1) \Φp
that is a logical truth and every sentence of Sent(L1) \ Φp that is a logical
consequence of {φ | νp(φ) = T} ∪ {¬φ | νp(φ) = F} has a determinate value.
6 Judging a Theory
In this section, I will deal with the criteria according to which the epistemic
quality of a system of postulates can be judged. The criteria obtained at the
end of this section will, in the next section, be shown to be equivalent with
the conditions under which the Ramsey sentence is true. As indicated in the
introduction, the present paper aims at establishing another solution to the
problem of theoretical terms, which is equivalent to the Ramsey solution. The
claim that the two solutions are equivalent is understood in the sense that the
criteria of judging a theory in the account being developed here are satisfied iff
the Ramsey sentence is true.
It is common to say that a theory is true iff its axioms are true propositions in
the intended domain of application. However, such an explanation is only appli-
cable if the non-logical symbols occurring in the axioms are already interpreted.
If, by contrast, the axioms are part of the interpretation of the non-logical sym-
bols, as is the case with postulates and theoretical terms, then the truth-value
assignment to the axioms of the theory implies no assertion about the factual
adequacy of this theory. The rules of truth set up in E9 even exclude that a
postulate is assigned to the value false. For this reason an alternative criteria
to judge the epistemic quality of a theory is sought for. Though there is no
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direct criterion of truth in the sense of factual adequacy, an indirect assessment
seems to be available, since the postulates ought to satisfy the requirement
of consistency in the context of the whole system of truth-value assignments.
Every deductive system is commonly subjected to this requirement for the sim-
ple reason that from an inconsistent set of sentences every arbitrary sentence
is derivable. The notion of consistency is usually introduced by the following
syntactic definition:
D 3. A set of sentences Φ is consistent as to derivations iff there is no sentence
φ such that Φ ` φ and Φ ` ¬φ.
In addition to the syntactic understanding, consistency with respect to semantic
consequences is of particular interest. This notion is introduced by Alonzo
Church (1956), p. 327, as follows:
D 4. A set of sentences Φ is consistent as to consequences iff there is no sentence
φ such that Φ |= φ and Φ |= ¬φ.
For reasons which will become obvious later on, the following considerations refer
to the notion of consistency as to consequences. The relationship between both
notions depends on whether the deductive system is sound and complete. In a
deductive system that is complete and sound, the notions are equivalent. If the
deductive system is sound but not complete, inconsistency as to consequences
follows from inconsistency as to derivations but not vice versa.
I may proceed to apply the criterion of consistency to a formal system with
postulates, assuming that E9 is adopted for the truth-value assignment to the-
oretical sentences. In such a system there are three types of sentences having
the value true:
i) The sentences of Φo = {φ | φ ∈ Sent(L(Vo)) and Ao |= φ}, where Ao is
the intended interpretation of the observational language.7
ii) The postulates TC.
iii) The sentences of Φt = {φ | φ ∈ Sent(L(Vo, Vt)) \ Sent(L(Vo)) \ ΦTC and
ΦTC ∪ Φo |= φ and ΦTC ∪ Φo ∪ {φ} is satisfiable}. Φt is the set of
theoretical sentences that are not postulates and are assigned to the value
true according to explanation E9.
If Φo ∪ ΦTC ∪ Φt is consistent, then the theory can be accepted, if not, it has
to be modified or discarded. It goes without saying that there may well be
7If there is more than one interpretation that satisfies an axiomatic system, then there
might be one single interpretation such that the axioms of that system were set up to account
for the truths of that interpretation. This interpretation is referred to by the term “intended
interpretation”. For example, there are several interpretations satisfying the Peano axioms,
but only the natural numbers are considered as the intended domain of interpretation for the
language in which that axiomatic system is formulated. Likewise, it is sensible to speak of an
intended intended interpretation of an observational language. Such an interpretation is such
that a certain truth-value assignment to the sentences of the formalized language results from
it; it can be given by expressions of a non-formalized meta-language and it.
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different theories each being compatible with the observational facts in one and
the same observational domain. That the rules adopted here do not determine
the postulates of a theory to be true or false by empirical facts nicely squares
with this well known consideration concerning the underdetermination of theory
by the observational data.
The criterion just developed for judging a theory - that is, the requirement that
Φo ∪ ΦTC ∪ Φt is consistent - refers to a set of sentences that contains redundant
information as there is a subset of Φo ∪ ΦTC ∪ Φt that logically implies every
sentence of that set. The same applies to the truth-rules for theoretical sentences
in E9. Certainly, redundancy is not desirable for computational and notational
reasons. Furthermore, transforming the criterion under consideration will turn
out to be helpful to show that this criterion is satisfied iff the Ramsey sentence
is true. By the following theorems we will accomplish a simplification of both
the criterion for judging the theory and the truth-rules for theoretical sentences:
Th 1. Φ is satisfiable iff there is no sentence φ such that Φ |= φ and Φ |= ¬φ.
Proof. For the left-to-right-direction, suppose Φ is satisfiable. Suppose further-
more, as assumption of an indirect proof, there is a sentence φ1 such that i) Φ
|= φ1 and ii) Φ |= ¬φ1. Since Φ is satisfiable, there is to be a structure A1 such
that A1 |= Φ, that means, every sentence of Φ is valid in A1. Furthermore φ1
must either be true or false in A1. To put it formally, either A1 |= φ1 or A1 |=
¬φ1 must hold. In the first case, A1 is a structure satisfying Φ and φ1, and thus
Φ ∪ φ1 is satisfiable. So, in this case, Φ |= ¬φ1 does not hold. In the second
case, A1 is a structure satisfying Φ and ¬φ1, and thus Φ ∪ ¬φ1 is satisfiable.
So, Φ |= φ1 does not hold. In both cases we receive a contradiction, either to i)
or to ii) above.
For the right-to-left direction, suppose there is no sentence φ such that i) Φ |= φ
and ii) Φ |= ¬φ. As assumption of the indirect proof take: Φ is not satisfiable.
If Φ is not satisfiable, then, trivially, every sentence φ is a semantic consequence
of Φ. Hence, there is a sentence φ1 such that i) Φ |= φ1 and ii) Φ |= ¬φ1. This
is a contradiction to the assumptions.8
Th 2. Φ1 and Φ2 are sets of sentences such that every sentence of Φ2 is a logical
consequence of Φ1. Then Φ1 ∪ Φ2 is satisfiable iff Φ1 is satisfiable.
Proof. For the left-to-right direction, assume that Φ1 ∪ Φ2 is satisfiable. Then
there is a structure satisfying every sentence of Φ1 and every one of Φ2. So,
trivially, Φ1 is satisfiable. For the right-to-left-direction, suppose Φ1 is satisfi-
able. Let A1 be a structure satisfying every sentence of Φ1. Since every sentence
of Φ2 is a logical consequence of Φ1, every sentence of Φ2 is valid in A1 which
follows from the definition of logical consequence. Hence, there is a structure
satisfying Φ1 ∪ Φ2.
Th 3. Φ1, Φ2, and Φ3 are sets of sentences. Φ2 ⊆ Φ3. Every sentence of Φ3 is
a logical consequence of Φ2. Then Φ1 ∪ Φ2 |= φ iff Φ1 ∪ Φ3 |= φ.
8The theorem just proved is also stated by Church (1956), p. 328. The proof is nevertheless
left to the reader.
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Proof. For the left-to-right direction, assume that Φ1 ∪ Φ2 |= φ. Then Mod(φ) ⊆
Mod(Φ1) ∩ Mod (Φ2), where Mod(Φ) stands for the set of structures satisfying
the set of sentences Φ. First we show that Mod(Φ2) = Mod(Φ3). Assume that A1
is a structure satisfying Φ2. Since every sentence of Φ3 is a logical consequence
of Φ2, A1 is also satisfying Φ3. Assume that A2 is a structure satisfying Φ3.
Since every sentence of Φ2 is a member of Φ3, A2 is also satisfying Φ2. Hence,
Mod(Φ2) = Mod(Φ3). Since Mod(φ) ⊆ Mod(Φ1) ∩ Mod (Φ2) and Mod(Φ2) =
Mod(Φ3), it holds that Mod(φ) ⊆ Mod(Φ1) ∩ Mod (Φ3). Thus, Φ1 ∪ Φ3 |= φ.
The right-to-left direction is analogous to the left-to-right direction.
In the domain of observational sentences it is sufficient to consider just the
atomic sentences instead of the whole set Φo, the set of true sentences of L(Vo).
Let Φao be the set containing every true atomic sentence of L(Vo) and the
negation of every false atomic sentence of this language. The interpretation of
the observational language be restricted to canonical structures. This means,
every individual of the domain in which L(Vo) is interpreted must be designated
by some constant of Vo in an interpretation of that language.9 Then, we can
prove the following theorem:
Th 4. Ao |= φ iff Φao |= φ, where φ is a sentence of L(Vo) and Ao the intended
interpretation of L(Vo).
Proof. For the left-to-right direct, suppose Ao |= φ1, where φ1 is a sentence of
L(Vo). Ao |= Φao holds due to the definition of the set Φao. In the so called
truth-value semantics the role of structures in the sense of model-theoretic se-
mantics is taken over by truth-value assignments to the set of atomic sentences.
Since the quantifiers are interpreted according to the substitutional reading, an
atomic truth-value assignment determines uniquely the value of every sentence
of the language. Although truth-value semantics is not adopted here, theorems
concerning the relation between truth-value semantics and model-theoretic se-
mantics will help to attain the intended result. If an atomic truth-value assign-
ment ν determines a sentence φ to be true, this sentence is said to be true on
ν. A set of sentences Φ is said to be true on an atomic truth-value assignment
ν iff every sentence of Φ is true on ν. In the following I adhere to the version of
truth-value semantics in which a sentence φ is said to be a logical consequence
of a set of sentences Φ iff, for every atomic truth-value assignment ν on which
Φ is true, φ is also true on ν.10 Furthermore, a set of sentences Φ is satisfiable
in the truth-value sense iff there is an atomic truth-value assignment on which
9The notion of a canonical structures has been adopted from Barwise (1977), p. 31. Carnap
himself requires that, for the observational language, every value of an individual variable is
designated by an expression of L(Vo). Carnap (1956), p. 41n. The restriction to canonical
structures for the interpretation of L(Vo) is therefore justified. Irrespective of Carnap’s par-
ticular concept of an observational language it is reasonable to require for such a language
that our linguistic means be sufficient to refer to every individual of the observational do-
main. For reasons of simplicity it is assumed in the present paper that every individual of
the observational domain is designated by an individual constant. If there were individuals
of the observational domain which are designated by a closed function expressions but not by
an individual constant, the argumentation would remain valid, though it would have to be
extended.
10This version is to be preferred if one aspires to have a kind of truth-value semantics being
equivalent to the model-theoretic one in which the domain of interpretations is restricted to
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every sentence of Φ is true. Now, consider the valuation νo(φ) = T iff φ ∈
Φao and νo (φ) = F iff ¬φ ∈ Φao. Obviously, νo(φ) is an atomic truth-value
assignment. It is also called the truth-value counterpart of Ao. Now, there is a
theorem saying that, for every canonical structure A and every sentence φ, A
|= φ iff φ is true on the truth-value counterpart of A. (See Leblanc (1976), p.
94.) Therefore, since, by supposition, Ao |= φ1, φ1 is also true on νo. Since,
obviously, νo is the only atomic truth-value assignment on which Φao is true, it
holds that, for every atomic truth-value assignment ν on which every sentence
of Φao is true, φ1 is also true on ν. Hence, φ1 is a logical consequence of Φao
in the truth-value sense just defined. Therefore, Φao ∪ {¬φ1} is not satisfiable
in the truth-value sense. Now, Φ is satisfiable in the truth-value sense iff there
is a canonical structure satisfying Φ. (See Leblanc (1976), p. 94.) Therefore,
since Φao ∪ {¬φ1} is not satisfiable in the truth-value sense, Φao |= φ1 holds
also in the model-theoretic sense, given the interpretation of the observational
language is restricted to canonical structures.
For the right-to-left direction, suppose Φao |= φ1. Let νo be, like above, the
truth-value counterpart of Ao. Since Φao |= φ1 holds in the model-theoretic
sense, φ1 is also a logical consequence of Φao in the truth-value sense. Then, by
Φao being true on νo, φ1 is true on νo. There is a theorem saying that, for every
canonical structure A and the corresponding truth-value counterpart ν, A |= φ
iff φ is true on ν. (See Leblanc (1976), p. 94.) Hence, Ao |= φ1.
How do the preceding theorems contribute to a simplification of the truth-rules
for theoretical sentences? By Th4, every sentence of Φo, the set of true L(Vo)
sentences, is a logical consequence of Φao. Th3 therefore applies to the sets ΦTC
∪ Φo and ΦTC ∪ Φao. Hence, ΦTC ∪ Φo |= φ iff ΦTC ∪ Φao |= φ. By analogous
reasons, Th2 applies to the sets ΦTC ∪ Φo ∪ {φ} and ΦTC ∪ Φao ∪ {φ}. Hence,
ΦTC ∪ Φo ∪ {φ} is satisfiable iff ΦTC ∪ Φao ∪ {φ} is satisfiable. This being the
case, the truth-rules in E9 admit of the following simplification:
E 9.1. νt(φ) is a partial valuation for sentences of Sent(L(Vo, Vt)) \Sent(L(Vo))
\ΦTC .
i) νt(φ) = T iff ΦTC ∪ Φao |= φ and ΦTC ∪ Φao ∪ {φ} is satisfiable.
ii) νt(φ) = F iff ΦTC ∪ Φao |= ¬φ and ΦTC ∪ Φao ∪ {¬φ} is satisfiable.
Hence, Φt, the set of true sentences at the theoretical level, is equivalent to the
set {φ | φ ∈ Sent(L(Vo, Vt)) \Sent(L(Vo)) \ΦTC and ΦTC ∪ Φao |= φ and ΦTC
∪ Φao ∪ {φ} is satisfiable}.
How do the preceding theorems contribute to simplify our criterion for judging
a theory in the sense of the dual-level conception? By Th1, ΦTC ∪ Φo ∪ Φt is
canonical structures. It is adopted by Stegmu¨ller in his (1984), p. 84, but rejected by Leblanc
in his (1976), p. 17n. Leblanc, unlike Stegmu¨ller, intends to have a truth-value semantics that
is equivalent to the model-theoretic one without restriction to canonical structures. (Leblanc
uses the term “Henkin structure” to refer to interpretations that are, in the present paper,
called canonical structures. See Leblanc (1976), p. 20.) The reason for my adherence to
Stegmu¨ller’s version is that the interpretation of L(Vo) is restricted to canonical structures.
This restriction has been explicitly mentioned as a premise of the theorem currently to be
proved.
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consistent as to consequences iff ΦTC ∪ Φo ∪ Φt is satisfiable. By Th4, every
sentence of Φo is a logical consequence of Φao. Th2 therefore applies to the sets
ΦTC ∪ Φo ∪ Φt and ΦTC ∪ Φao ∪ Φt. Hence, ΦTC ∪ Φo ∪ Φt is satisfiable iff
ΦTC ∪ Φao ∪ Φt is satisfiable. Since, by E9.2, every sentence of Φt is a logical
consequence of ΦTC ∪ Φao, Th2 applies to the sets ΦTC ∪ Φao ∪ Φt and ΦTC ∪
Φao. Hence, ΦTC ∪ Φao ∪ Φt is satisfiable iff ΦTC ∪ Φao is satisfiable. To sum,
ΦTC ∪ Φo ∪ Φt is consistent as to consequences iff ΦTC ∪ Φao is satisfiable. So,
the considerations of the present section may be summarized by the following
proposition:
P 2. TC is a theory in the sense of the dual-level conception of scientific lan-
guage. Ao is the intended interpretation of the observational language L(Vo).
Φao is the set that contains every atomic sentence of L(Vo) being true in Ao
and the negation of every atomic sentence of L(Vo) being false in Ao. E9 is
adopted as rules for the truth-value assignment to theoretical sentences. Then
the postulates TC cannot be assigned to the value false whatever the empirical
facts may be. The theory TC is rather subject to the following two equivalent
criteria:
i) ΦTC ∪ Φao is satisfiable.
ii) ΦTC ∪ Φao is consistent as to consequences.
The equivalence of these criteria follows from Th1.
7 Comparison to the Ramsey Account
By a careful examination of the notion of an indirect interpretation we have seen
that the postulates of a theory are to be understood as imposing a constraint
on the admissible valuations of theoretical terms and sentences. Since, on this
reading of postulates, the problem of theoretical terms does not arise, the present
account amounts to a second solution to the problem of theoretical terms. This
solution is equivalent to the Ramsey solution in the sense that the criteria for
judging a system of postulates, as given by proposition P2, are satisfied iff the
corresponding Ramsey sentence is true:
Th 5. The Ramsey sentence TCR is true iff ΦTC ∪ Φao is satisfiable, where
Φao is a sentential representation of the observational facts, as explained in P2.
Proof. For the left-to-right direction, suppose TCR is true. This means, (Do,
Dt, ao) |= ∃X1 . . . ∃Xn TC(X1, . . . , Xn, n1, . . . , nk), where Do is the domain of
interpretation of the observable language, Dt the domain of interpretation of
the theoretical language, and ao a function assigning extensional interpretations
to the predicate and function symbols and the individual constants. (Do, ao) =
Ao is the intended interpretation of the observational language. Ao |= Φao holds
by definition of Φao. The truth of TCR amounts to the fact that there is an
extensional interpretation of the non-logical symbols of the theoretical vocabu-
lary on which the postulates TC are true, where the observational vocabulary is
interpreted according to ao. Call this interpretation (ao/t, at), where ao/t stands
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for the extensional interpretation of theoretical terms with “mixed” argument
structure, i. e. argument structures having places for individuals of Do and Dt,
whereas at is the interpretation of theoretical terms whose argument structure
admits no individuals of Do.11 Hence, (Do, Dt, ao, ao/t, at) |= TC. Since the
truth-value assignment to sentences of L(Vo) is not affected by the interpreta-
tion of the theoretical vocabulary, (Do, Dt, ao, ao/t, at) |= Φao holds in the light
of Ao |= Φao. Hence, (Do, Dt, ao, ao/t, at) |= Φao ∪ ΦTC . Therefore Φao ∪ ΦTC
is satisfiable.
For the left-to-right-direction, suppose Φao ∪ ΦTC is satisfiable. Hence, there
is a structure (Do1, Dt1, ao1, ao1/t1, at1) |= Φao ∪ ΦTC , call it A1. Since
(Do1, ao1) may well be distinct from (Do, ao), this does not immediately imply
the truth of TCR. It is therefore necessary to construct from A1 a structure
for L(Vo, Vt) which agrees with ao on the interpretation of the observational
vocabulary. Now, let pi be a function mapping individuals of Do1 to those of Do
according the following equation:
(7) ao(c) = pi(ao1(c)) for every individual constant c of L(Vo).
So, pi is defined by the requirement that, if the constant c designates an in-
dividual a on ao1, then the value of pi(a) is the individual designated by c on
ao. Since (Do, ao) is a canonical structure, every individual of Do belongs to
the domain of values of pi. Hence, pi is surjective. Furthermore, pi is injective
iff from pi(ao1(ci)) = pi(ao1(cj)) it follows that ao1(ci) = ao1(cj) for every pair
of individual constants (ci, cj) of L(Vo). Suppose pi(ao1(ci)) = pi(ao1(cj)) for
an arbitrary, but determinate pair (ci, cj). Hence, by ao(c) = pi(ao1(c)), ao(ci)
= ao(cj). Now, ao(ci) = ao(cj) iff the atomic sentence ci = cj is true on ao.
Analogously, ao1(ci) = ao1(cj) iff the sentence ci = cj is true on ao1. Since ao
and ao1 agree on the values of the atomic sentences and L(Vo) contains a sign
for identity, ao(ci) = ao(cj) iff ao1(ci) = ao1(cj). Then, from ao(ci) = ao(cj) it
follows that ao1(ci) = ao1(cj). Hence, pi is injective. So, since pi is also surjective,
pi is bijective. Now, consider the function pic : Do1 ∪ Dt1 → Do ∪Dt:
(8) pic = {pic(a) = pi(a) for every individual a of Do1 and
pic(a) = a for every individual a of Dt1}.
Note that Dt1 = Dt, since there is, in Carnap’s version of the dual-level con-
ception, no variation in the domain of interpretation of the Vt symbols, the
non-logical symbols of the theoretical vocabulary. Obviously, pic is also bijec-
tive. Through the help of pic we construct a structure A2 = (Do, Dt, ao2, ao2/t2,
at2):
i) ao2(c) = pic(ao1(c)) for every individual constant c of L(Vo).
11It may well happen that there is a function that takes empirical objects as arguments
and has individuals of the theoretical domain as values. To give an example, we need such
functions to express formally that a particular empirical object has a certain mass. The
necessity to distinguish between theoretical terms with mixed and pure theoretical argument
structure is pointed out by Ketland (2004), p. 290.
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ii) (pic(a1), . . . , pic(an)) ∈ ao2(P) iff (a1, . . . , an) ∈ ao1(P) for every n-ary pred-
icate symbol P of L(Vo) and a1, . . . , an ∈ Do1.
iii) ao2(f)(pic(a1), . . . , pic(an)) = pic(ao1(f)(a1, . . . , an)) for every n-ary func-
tion symbol f of L(Vo) and a1, . . . , an ∈ Do1.
iv) (pic(a1), . . . , pic(ak), pic(a1), . . . , pic(an)) ∈ ao2/t2(P) iff (a1, . . . , ak, a1, . . . , an)
∈ ao1/t1(P) for every (n+k)-ary predicate symbol P of L(Vo, Vt) with mixed
argument structure, where a1, . . . , ak ∈ Do1 and a1, . . . , an ∈ Dt.
v) ao2(f)(pic(a1), . . . , pic(ak), pic(a1), . . . , pic(an)) = pic(ao1(f)(a1, . . . , ak, a1, . . . , an))
for every (k+n)-ary function symbol f of L(Vo, Vt) with mixed argument
structure, where a1, . . . , ak ∈ Do1 and a1, . . . , an ∈ Dt.
vi) at2 = at1.
a(α) designates the interpretation of the symbol α according to a, where α can
be a constant, a predicate or a function symbol. Since pic is an isomorphism
from Do1 ∪ Dt1 to Do ∪ Dt, the construction rules i) to vi) guarantee that A1
and A2 are isomorphic. Since in isomorphic structures the same sentences are
true, it follows from A1 |= Φao ∪ ΦTC that A2 |= Φao ∪ ΦTC . Hence, there is
an extensional interpretation of the theoretical terms on which the postulates
are true sentences, where the observational terms are interpreted according to
ao. Hence, TCR.
The Ramsey sentence thus turns out to be equivalent to a proposition of the
meta-language stating that the postulates are semantically compatible with a
sentential representation of the observational facts.12 Hence, there are, arguably,
two accounts of the semantic peculiarities of theoretical terms. The one in
the present paper is deeply inspired by Carnap’s Logical Syntax of Language.
The truth-rules for theoretical sentences are developed under the assumption
that the postulates are set up as P-Grundsa¨tze in the sense of this work. P-
Grundsa¨tze, or P-rules in the English edition, are admitted to have empirical
content, yet their truth-value is neither determined by the interpretation of the
non-logical symbols nor by the values of atomic sentences. The present account
may therefore be called the Logical Syntax of Language account of a scientific
theory, or shorter, the LSL account.
8 The Logical Status of Postulates
There is, according to Stegmu¨ller, a close connection between the problem of
theoretical terms and there being sentences in most scientific theories which
are neither factual statements nor definitions. Such sentences, so Stegmu¨ller
12That the Ramsey sentence is equivalent to a proposition of the meta-language is not a
completely new insight. Ketland has proved that TCR to a the claim that Ao, the intended
interpretation of L(Vo), can be expanded to an L(Vo, Vt) structure satisfying the postulates.
See Ketland (2004), p. 293. However, Ketland assumes a direct interpretation of the theoretical
terms and thus makes no contribution to the problem under consideration in the present paper.
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(1976), p. 11 argues, cannot be interpreted as true statements in the sense
of predicate logic. With respect to the truth-rules of standard semantics, this
argumentation seems to be fully justified. In standard model-theoretic semantics
the truth-value of a logical complex sentence that does not qualify as a definition
is determined by the interpretation of the non-logical symbols. This kind of
truth-value assignment implies, as shown above, the semantic circle that Sneed
has termed the problem of theoretical terms.
I have hereby identified standard semantics with model-theoretic semantics and
furthermore I assumed that, in any application of model-theoretic semantics to
an empirical domain, the relevant fragment of language has one and only one
intended interpretation representing the state of the domain. The uniqueness
of interpretation, at least from the perspective of a single speaker, is a common
convention in linguistics and philosophy of language. Now, if there is one and
only one structure assumed to represent the state of the relevant domain, then
the following division of sentences is complete:
i) Synthetic sentences, i. e. sentences which are true in, at least, one structure
and false in, at least, another.
ii) Logical truths and logical falsehoods, i. e. sentences which are either true
in every structure or false in every structure.
iii) Sentences having the status of a definition.
Such a classification leaves no room indeed for a semantically satisfying in-
terpretation of postulates in predicate logic. The account developed here is,
consequently, based on a rejection of the uniqueness assumption, that is, the as-
sumption that the state of the world, or a fragment of it, can be represented by
one and only one structure. This assumption remains valid only with respect to
the observational language. By contrast, in the whole language L(Vo, Vt), every
structure that is an extension of the intended interpretation of the observational
language and satisfies the postulates is considered to represent the state of the
world, or a fragment of it.
It is illuminating if postulates are seen as semantically consistent extensions of
the language. More precisely, postulates are required to extend the language in
a consistent manner. Since the meaning of theoretical terms is introduced by
postulates, the postulates extend the language. Nevertheless, since postulates
may have and do have empirical consequences, they are, unlike definitions, not
required to be conservative extensions of the language. Consistency is rather ap-
propriate to require from postulates. This characterization nicely squares with
a remark of Carnap (1975), p. 82, concerning the twofold function of postulates:
They [the postulates, H. A.] not only contribute to the meanings
of the T-terms but they also set forth the factual content of the
theory. This is evident from the fact that with their help, along
with sentences on observable processes, predictions can be derived of
futu re observable processes. Hence, a C-postulate or a T-postulate
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cannot in general (aside from certain special cases which we here
leave aside) be taken as an A-postulate [i. e. an analytic sentence
not being logically true, H.A.].
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